The U.S. is wasting its resources by pushing for democracy in Afghanistan, says history professor Andrew J. Bacevich. “Afghanistan produces and possesses nothing of interest to the U.S.,” he told DigitalJournal.com in an interview.
Within the past week, we heard how the Obama administration is strengthening its push against Taliban forces in Afghanistan. The U.S. president recently admitted coalition forces have “a long way to go” in order to bring peace to the region. But on Tuesday, Obama said he is looking for an exit strategy.
It’s a policy change coming at a poignant time: July is looking to be the deadliest month for US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. As of Wednesday, at least 46 international troops, including 24 Americans, had been killed in Afghanistan this month.
In the opinion of at least one academic, the U.S. should have left Afghanistan a long time. Boston University history and international relations professor Andrew J. Bacevich says the U.S. should have never dove into Afghanistan in the first place.
The argument for rushing into Afghanistan relies on the assumption that the Taliban is a looming danger to the U.S., he says. Or some say Al Qaeda operates out of Afghan cities. “But I don’t see any evidence to suggest that a major US military presence on the ground in Afghanistan will eliminate Osama bin Laden and chief lieutenants.”
Bacevich says Americans have spent too much money on a war of choice, not necessity. In the Atlantic Monthly, he wrote, “Transforming Iraq has cost roughly $1 trillion, with the meter still running and the job unfinished. Transforming Afghanistan, by any measure an even more daunting task, is likely to cast as much or more. That’s money we don’t have.”
The U.S. is considering an exit strategy from Afghanistan where power would be given to responsible personnel. Obama recently said: “All of us want to see an effective exit strategy where increasingly the Afghan army, Afghan police, Afghan courts, Afghan government are taking more responsibility for their own security.”
Bavecich questions the U.S. role in Afghanistan, a country where the U.S. has no vital interests, he says. “Does it make sense to invest such enormous resources in a place so unimportant to us?”
The rhetorical question leads to a proposed solution: let the tribal chiefs rule, Bacevich suggests. Offer them the incentives of money and guns to keep jihadists out. The U.S. can use force to take out specific Al Qaeda training camps, and also maintain surveillance over certain regions.
With tongue firmly planted in cheek, Bacevich recommends the White House turn its attention to Mexico, a country in more desperate need of intervention than Afghanistan. “If people are so gung-ho to nation-build, why not focus on a country that’s actually important to us?” Bacevich would argue that Mexican drug-traffickers are a bigger threat to Americans than the Taliban.
Bacevich also urges the White House to seek a czar for strategy, someone who could be the Henry Kissinger of 2009. That kind of strategist could help pull the U.S. out of its entrenched position in Afghanistan.
