The Kharkiv region was one of the very first parts of Ukraine to be attacked. Now, it’s the scene of another debacle for Russia; a sudden strike which has liberated a lot of territory in a few days. Russia is scrambling to respond, belatedly.
The Russians weren’t the only ones taken by surprise. Military pundits are now asking whether the big, relatively slow Ukrainian Kherson offensive was actually a distraction. Nobody knows, and the Ukrainians, of course, aren’t saying anything.
The story so far is that the Ukrainians aren’t meeting much opposition in the Kharkiv region. They’ve taken control of a lot of territory to the east and south of Kharkiv. The general theory is that the Russians reshuffled their troops to manage their own eastern offensive in the Donbas and bolster the Kherson region.
This is a war where theory is losing badly to practice. The military pundits are trying to analyze a war which is rewriting theory, and not having a lot of luck.
A few basic points:
- This is a war of territorial and tactical control.
- Neither side has the troops to occupy every square inch.
- The maps show who controls territories, not actual positions.
- There are a LOT of empty spaces.
- The “lines” are just local positions.
- The trench warfare in the Donbas doesn’t necessarily apply anywhere else.
In this situation, static positions aren’t so great. They’re sitting ducks for HIMARS and other precision weapons. The Russians are in a truly lousy position with reduced ammo and supplies.
They’re still making constant usually ineffectual small-scale attacks in the east. The big “pincer” attack to cut off the Ukrainians in the east failed dismally. They’ve lost air superiority.
The defining factor in this war is that the Ukrainians have been able to beat the Russians in just about every mobile encounter. The Russian siege warfare tactics with heavy artillery in the east are pretty questionable options anywhere else in Ukraine.
Analysis
The Ukrainian northern attacks are pushing into areas the Russians can’t really defend well, if at all. The Ukrainians have the tactical advantage, able to dictate where and when the fighting happens.
The current story is that Ukraine is using relatively small, agile units to penetrate the Russian-controlled zones. These are good tactics; relatively low risk, and creating a strategic mess the Russians probably can’t control.
This northern region also contains Russian supply lines which are being compromised by the Ukrainian advances. The remarkably stagnant northern arm of the Russian “pincer” attack is in trouble.
Things weren’t so good for the Russians in the north to start with. In Izyum, a large number of Russian units have been conscientiously achieving absolutely nothing for months.
These are the remnants of the famous hundred or so Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) from April. Not much has been heard about these troops ever since. Losing their supply lines or having to re-reshuffle the deck chairs to manage Ukrainian incursions may well be beyond the capabilities of the local Russian forces.
Russian lateral security is famously godawful. It’s debatable whether they can even keep track of Ukrainian troop movements, let alone do much about them. So far, indications are that they can’t.
What’s so good about the Ukrainian tactics is that they’re now calling the shots. They can hit anywhere and everywhere. The Russians have been forced into purely reactive responses.
Worse, they’ve been forced into predictable responses. How are they supposed to counter multiple deep penetrations over such a large area? With what are they supposed to make countermoves? Press releases?
Can those big clumsy guns chase the Ukrainians over an area the size of the eastern border of France? Can what’s left of Russia’s mobile forces do much about it? Can a rabble of unpaid troops short of everything do anything at all?
Doesn’t look like it. Looks, in this case, do mean something. What you’re seeing really does define the current state of this war in so many ways. The Ukrainians don’t even need to take or hold specific areas of ground. They can simply go on the rampage and drag the Russians around the region with relatively small forces.
The Ukrainians have the option to take and hold ground or not. The Russians don’t have any choices in these matters. They have to defend, or take more catastrophic losses and risk making their support systems even more vulnerable.
Meanwhile, back in Kherson
The Ukrainian Kherson offensive is highly methodical. There’s no indication the Ukrainians are in any great hurry, but they’re achieving quite a lot in this area. This is a hypersensitive area for the Russians. It’s close to Crimea. In theory, the Ukrainians could make the Russian southern “land bridge” very vulnerable, as well as cutting off Crimea.
…So the Russians have to defend it. A large number of Russian troops have been moved to the region. The Ukrainians destroyed the one and only bridge for supplies into Kherson, and the pontoon bridge the Russians built to replace it. It’s a brittle-looking situation for the Russians.
Kherson was also the first major city taken by the Russians at the start of the war. It’s a matter of prestige for them to hold it. Can they? Probably not, in the long term, and maybe not even in the short term.
There are supposedly about 20,000 Russian troops in the region. (Round numbers are usually wrong.) That’s about 15% of the Russian forces in Ukraine. The state of Russian supplies could be anything, but it can’t be good.
They haven’t been able to push back much, if at all. These troops were supposed to be attacking Mykolaiv but nothing of the sort has happened, Obviously these forces have other problems, as well as the Ukrainian counterattacks.
This is make or break in the south for the Russians. It’s a grim picture. If they hold Kherson, they’ll take significant attrition. They’ll lose troops they can’t afford to lose. If they don’t hold, how are those troops supposed to get out of there?
Again, the Ukrainian tactics are dominant, dictating the terms of combat. The Russians have a choice to sit there and get cut to pieces or try tactical moves which have failed abysmally in the past.
The Kherson region is a magnet for Russian resources to the exclusion of just about all else. Holding Kherson with inadequate forces would be a disaster. The trick here is that Kherson is weakening the entire Russian army, at the very limit of its support capabilities. It’s a bit like scrimping and saving to pay the gas bill while the house burns down around them.
Thanks to politics, the Russians can’t simply abandon Kherson. That would be the simpler, smarter move, but no, Moscow wants them to hold. A bogus referendum was supposed to be held with citizens voting to join Russia. Now, things are so bad they can’t even hold the referendum with the Ukrainians on the doorstep.
A thankless war for Russia
Can the Russians actually hold Crimea? This used to be a rhetorical question. Now, it’s a working question about actual Russian capabilities. Crimea can get support across the Kerch Strait, but how much support does Russia have left to give?
This incredibly wasteful, irresponsible war has decimated Russian combat power. The Ukrainians may not even have to take Crimea. It could simply fall through lack of support. That would be much more than a purely symbolic situation. It would mean Russia has failed utterly in this war.
Check out the inventory for the Russians – Donetsk and Luhansk are wastelands. The separatists are in an almost unbelievably bad situation, physically and economically. There’s no “victory” to be had there; just a couple of graveyards. The Russians aren’t holding in the north. The “land bridge” is just a shooting gallery for the Ukrainians. (It was always going to be exactly that.)
Only a fool would insist on fighting a war so obviously lost. Yet, that’s what’s happening.
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Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this Op-Ed are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Digital Journal or its members.
