There are far too many problems with Donald Trump’s insistence on an unconditional surrender by Iran. Geopolitically, militarily and economically, there are other parties who stand to gain a lot from a long war.
Let’s keep it extremely simple.
You don’t stop a war by simply setting a time limit.
You don’t achieve regime change without substantial pressure and the presence of organized, reliable support inside the country.
You can’t commit major military assets without a huge cost and diverting resources from elsewhere.
Generating high levels of political antagonism with allies doesn’t help.
Cooperation has been muted at best.

First, the military situation:
Iran’s vast swathes of fossil military assets are barely relevant. The occasional more modern asset might be, but they can easily be replaced.
Iran can’t fight a conventional war on any level against the US and Israel and they know it. The current state of the Iranian response is a stopgap. Their default has to be asymmetric warfare, in which they specialize.
Iran has the money to wage a long-term war at terrorist level and plenty of people who know how to fight a war like that. Israel’s moves against Hezbollah in Lebanon indicate that sort of war is exactly what they’re expecting.
It’s not just Iran to be dealt with. This is a Hydra with more than one head. Associated groups throughout the Middle East and elsewhere are perfectly capable of mounting a wide variety of terror strikes without direct Iranian physical involvement.
This is now an ongoing regional war. All of the above points equate to potential long-term high-end security commitments for the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and perhaps Türkiye.

It cannot be overstated that the risk of this war going global is very real. Massive terror strike attempts must be considered likely. Attacks on overseas US assets are “normal” in these wars.
Any commitment of ground forces cannot be limited. It could well be another Iraq. If not another Afghanistan. There’s no indication of the scale of commitment required, either.
The US is at serious risk of military and logistical overreach. The US military has somehow become almost the sole means of US power projection, and it’s not working. Nobody is budging on any level. Let’s just not mention the severe backlog of upgrades the US forces are accumulating.
Wearing out first-line combat forces can’t be a good move. There is depth at the second line, but not necessarily anything like enough to manage such a vast range of commitments.
The political situation:
Iran can’t “surrender”, anyway. Surrender would be instant, literally suicidal for the regime, and they know it. They can move to Russia, like Assad, but will they? It took a decade to oust Assad from a much weaker country.
Opposition in the US to the war is strong and vocal and will sooner or later be effective. Getting Congressional approval for anything could be tough, and impossible after the mid-term elections. Iran could simply hang on till the elections.
Israel could be left stranded without US support. Israel is far stronger than Iran militarily, but politically, the situation is far different. The war in Gaza and its bizarre lack of focus on eradicating the main problem, Hamas, have made Israel extremely unpopular, generating large-scale hostility.
The image of Israel and the US attacking Iran is straight from Iranian propaganda. This war is proving that image right.
Iran can get long-term military and economic support from elsewhere. All the Iranians have to do is get that support in place. This war could effectively bog down in a week or so. They could also update their military mausoleum with credible systems.
China will gain from yet another American overcommitment to a black hole of problems. China doesn’t have to do much if anything except to answer a phone call from Iran.
America has a lot to lose, not least what’s left of its reputation.
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Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this Op-Ed are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Digital Journal or its members.
