The argument for a major counteroffensive by Ukraine now comes with qualifiers. A relatively small localized Ukrainian attack seems to have unhinged Russian positions and caused withdrawals. Months of Russian attacks have come completely unglued with a bit of a nudge from relatively small Ukrainian forces.
Bakhmut is a monument to obsolete tactics and non-existent strategy on the part of Russia. Nothing useful whatsoever has been achieved. Casualties are appalling. The Wagner Group has been effectively gutted. Prigozhin is clearly looking for a way out.
Anyone with the slightest tactical understanding would definitely be trying to get out. Bakhmut is the rock that broke the Russian offensive. Wagner is now saying, correctly, that its troops are threatened by Russian army withdrawals on the flanks. I’d guess the Wagner forces don’t want to be trapped in Bakhmut for some reason.
The Russian army could equally say that they simply can’t hold, and nobody would argue. Wagner has been getting the publicity, but the Russian forces on either side of Bakhmut haven’t been doing too well either. Time has been working hard against the Russians.
In any event, Bakhmut is a death trap for the Russians. Pulling back or getting annihilated are the options.
Various reports of Russian forces routing or being trapped are a sort of ongoing audit trail of endemic Russian problems. Months of failed attacks must have done a lot of damage to morale, as well as troop numbers. The Russians around Bakhmut don’t even have a reason to believe they can succeed.
From the Ukrainian perspective, these attacks, apparently conducted without the new weapons from the West, make a clear point. Russian resistance is weakening rapidly and visibly.
The big question for the Ukrainians is simple enough. Do they really need to engage in a big demanding counteroffensive, when they can simply pick and choose objectives? The Russians seem to be in a Kherson-like state of risk aversion.
The Kherson offensive was conducted carefully and well. There were no “theatrical” elements in that attack. No melodrama; just good tactical sense at all levels. The Russians took the hint and pulled out. That’s likely to happen again wherever the Ukrainians attack.
The options for a few exploratory pushes are clear enough. The Russians have made the entire occupied area an unmissable and practically indefensible target. They simply don’t have the troops to defend such large spaces. Any successful Ukrainian push will deliver value, wherever it happens.
The Russians also appear to be basing their local defenses on static tactics. That can’t and won’t work. They can’t conduct a war of maneuver anymore. Mobile situations can simply outrun their ability to respond.
They can be outflanked and outmaneuvered fairly simply. They’re effectively out of tanks and other vehicles. Even their artillery is at best semi-mobile and can be outgunned at will.
It’s a win-win situation for the Ukrainians. Static forces are basically no more than targets. The Russians have been making sitting ducks out of themselves for months in dug-in positions. Barely mobile Russian forces would have to expose themselves to try to manage any Ukrainian attacks.
How this massive debacle rebounds in Russia will be interesting to see. The bottom line is that an ex-superpower can’t win a battle 100km from its own borders. The myth is dead. Outright defeat will be obvious at all levels of Russian society. The blame game starts here.
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Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this Op-Ed are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Digital Journal or its members.
