Op-Ed: U.S. Commander says Afghan war will be lost without more troops

U.S. President Barack Obama is reserving his decision, understandably so, as U.S. politics goes through its usual ritual of shifting enthusiasms for wars. The report, submitted to Congress by McChrystal, has come as a definite reality check during a turgid Democratic Party revision of positions. As the New York Times reports:

“Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible,” General McChrystal states in the document.

In his five-page commander’s summary, General McChrystal ends on a cautiously optimistic note: “While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.”

But throughout the document, General McChrystal warns that unless he is provided more forces and a robust counterinsurgency strategy, the war in Afghanistan is most likely lost.

It takes professional guts for a serving soldier to produce a report like this. It's also called “Telling people what they’d rather not hear, when they don’t want to hear it at all.” McChrystal’s upper estimates are believed to run as high as 45,000 extra troops, a number likely to cause more heartburn for America’s decision makers. The situation in Afghanistan has also deteriorated thanks to some definitely publicity-slanted Taliban efforts. Recent attacks, which if not doing a lot of actual damage, have received wide media coverage, and therefore rung the bells of the politicians. The recent deaths of six Italian soldiers were treated like Rome's response to a second Cannae in the world’s media, and the UK's sad but similarly small numbers of fatalities also received global coverage. The "body bag" factor is also getting misrepresented with gay abandon around the world. The U.S. has sustained about 800 fatalities in Afghanistan in eight years, or the equivalent of less than a year's road fatalities in national terms. Proportionately, in terms of troops employed, this is a fatality rate of less than 1 per cent. Compare this with 50,000 deaths in Vietnam in roughly the same time span, and you may see some disproportionate values creeping in to assessments. Either you're fighting a war, or a publicity campaign. In case anyone's forgotten, those troops didn't go to Afghanistan on holidays. The problem that caused the invasion remains. The job hasn't been done. If it's not done, the fanatics will call it a victory, and it will be a recruiting poster for more wars. You can see the ads now: "Join the nutcases, see the world, and blow yourself up in scenic locations." This is a world war in many ways, it's just not being called one. America’s various efforts to achieve political ends by military means are well known. Its attempts to achieve military goals using politically oriented methods are infamous, particularly when the politics are vacillating with every opinion aired by everybody with a blog or a tweet. It's a matter of opinion if political considerations are even related to the realities in this case. The Vietnam analogy is almost entirely inappropriate in regard to Afghanistan, but some political analogies are starting to look ominously similar, in terms of the U.S. inability to find and agree on working methods:

General McChrystal has publicly stated many of the conclusions in his report: emphasizing the importance of protecting civilians over just engaging insurgents, restricting air strikes to reduce civilian casualties, and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces and accelerating their training.

The civilian issues are a case in point. Another perspective on this situation is that civilians are being permitted to live in combat zones. It’s within the Afghanistan government’s power to relocate people in operational areas, and in terms of international law, taking measures to protect civilians is an expected provision. Removing civilians from an area like Helmand Province, for example, would make combat a lot simpler, and also remove the support, willing or unwilling, for the Taliban. It would also remove them from the threat of retaliation by the Taliban. This was occasionally done in Vietnam, and it worked, removing the support infrastructure from the Viet Cong. In some parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban have been able to engage in firefights for several hours at a time, against strong opposition, which suggests they have logistic support in those areas. The two issues of civilian proximity and Taliban support, are indivisible. Another problem, familiar to those who’ve been watching Afghanistan for a while, is repeating the Russian operational and tactical doctrine mistakes. Road bound armies can’t do the job in this country. Every road in Afghanistan was a trap for the Russians. IEDs against Allied troops are more effective on roads than anywhere else. I'd suggest these casualties are quite avoidable, if someone tries to avoid them. Then there’s the training situation: Troops trained to fight NATO style Western wars have been found wanting, in the same way the Russians, trained to fight World War 3, were at a distinct disadvantage. The Taliban themselves, fighting against Achmed Shah Massoud’s forces, made similar errors, using conventional tactics in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong opponent, who was fully prepared for them. Extra troops, if properly used, and if the combat scenarios are managed to allow maximum use of resources, could do a lot in Afghanistan. The Taliban don’t have infinite resources, nor do they have infinite numbers of fighters. During the original invasion, they were so severely reduced in capabilities by initial combat that there was comparative peace for several years. The Taliban forces now facing the allies are a rebuilt organization, and it’s also stretched, fighting locally, rather than nationally. The Pakistani military, with nothing like U.S. capacity, and despite its limitations, was able to remove the Taliban from a large province, when able to apply its full weight. There’s only one real issue in Afghanistan: Decide what you're trying to achieve, and get your methods right.