According to terms of the deal, Iran will reduce its declared and known uranium stockpiles by approximately 98 percent, and will agree to halt further enrichment. The uranium will either be diluted, or else sold.
Iran will also reduce its 19,000 installed centrifuges to just over 6,000. The decommissioned centrifuges will be sent to a storage facility that will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Meanwhile, the heavy Arak water nuclear reactor will be redesigned to prevent Iran from being able to develop weapons-grade plutonium at the site, and the country has agreed not to build any more heavy reactors. Iran’s Fordow nuclear site, which is buried deep underground, will be converted into a peaceful research facility.
Perhaps most importantly, and breaking from a long-standing record of tough-words-but-little-action international agreements, the nuclear accords will have an aggressive “snap back” mechanism. If Iran is found to be in violation of the terms of the agreement and to be pursuing nuclear weapons, sanctions can quickly be put back into effect.
Still, many critics question the ability of the United States and others to monitor Iran’s activities. The agreement includes only known facilities, and it is entirely possible that other facilities have been built, but remain out of sight. Military sites may also only be inspected after approval from a board made up of members from all negotiating parties, and could take as long as 24 days before approval, which would potentially allow Iran to cover up illicit activities.
Perhaps even more worrisome, the arms embargo placed on Iran will be gradually lifted over the next eight years. In five years, Iran will be able to purchase conventional weapons. In eight years, it will be able to purchase ballistic weapons.
In a Forbes op-ed, Iranian opposition leader Mrs. Rajavi argues that while the United States may have been trying to come to term with Iran as part of its larger campaign against the Islamic State and terrorism, Iran itself must shoulder much of the instability racking the region. Iran’s Shia-based revolutionary ideology, export of arms to allied groups across the region, and influence over the Shia-dominated government of Iraq will stoke the fires of extremism across the Middle East.
Within this context, the flow of conventional arms into Iran in the next five years could turn out to be especially worrisome. Once Iran can resume international purchases of weapons, it could potentially funnel those weapons to allied groups across the region, sparking instability.
Maryam Rajavi also saw the negotiations as a missed opportunity to force even more dramatic change, noting:
Had the P5+1 been more decisive, the Iranian regime would have had no choice but to fully retreat from and permanently abandon its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Specifically, it would have been compelled to halt all uranium enrichment and completely shut down its bomb-making projects.
