The vote is to take place today but a report indicates the HoR has not yet received the new names proposed for the GNA cabinet. The earlier GNA was rejected because the HoR thought that there were too many ministries. The group has boycotted the meetings since the HoR started operations in August 2014. The HoR mandate ran out in October of last year. It extended its term unilaterally without any legal basis for doing so. As with so many irregularities in the whole process of setting up the GNA this fact is conveniently ignored. The boycotters will be sworn in so they can vote on the GNA. Three of the six are from Sebha in the south. In the last vote, 10 boycotters showed up but were too late to be sworn in and join in the vote.
Faiez Serraj, head of the GNA Presidency Council, has called together a meeting with members of the Political Dialogue in Skhirat, Morocco, to discuss the latest proposals for the GNA . The Dialogue is the group who were involved in the year-long negotiations that were supposed to reach an agreement between the two rival governments and other stakeholders. The result was to be the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) that would bring peace and a Government of National Accord (GNA) to Libya. While a UN-brokered draft agreement was reached, neither the HoR nor the rival Tripoli-based General National Congress(GNC) approved the agreement. The head of the United Nations Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Martin Kobler, did an end-run around that problem by gathering together only members who agreed to the GNA. The group included representatives from both the GNC and the HoR. No members from either group were authorized by their respective parliaments to sign the deal. Indeed, the GNC member who signed the document had left the negotiating party in August while the deal was signed on December 17. None of this bothered the UN. The UN Security Council later gave its blessing to this deliberate move to create an agreement not approved by either parliament. Unfortunately for the UN, the terms of the deal require that the HoR give a vote of confidence in the GNA before its term starts. That still has not happened. A meeting of foreign ministers in Rome also gave their blessing and support for the GNA. Serraj was required to consult with members of the Dialogue before announcing the GNA government, according to Article 3 of the agreement. When he presented the first set of names he had not bothered to do so. Just one more example to show that when the big powers want something due process can be jettisoned.
While the 10-day deadline for the GNA to present a new cabinet to the HoR has already passed, the Libya Observer reports that disagreement over the names of the interior minister and the defense minister has led to the postponement of the announcement of the cabinet. One more deadline down but never any repercussions. The GNA media arm said the cabinet would be announced as soon as consensus was reached. Western Libyan representatives are said to be lobbying to be able to name the interior ministry and the eastern representatives want to be able to name the defense minister.
The depth of division is shown in a statement from the Operation Dignity Brigades who insist that they should be able to name the defense minister. Operation Dignity was started in 2014 in May by General Khalifa Haftar, who is now commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA). In effect this operation is largely responsible for the present conflict between the two rival governments. While designed to rid Libya of Islamists, Haftar includes the members of the GNC and its main armed forces the Libya Dawn as Islamist enemies to be defeated. He would not negotiate with them or agree to a ceasefire with them. He has said this many times. The Dignity Operations armed brigades in Benghazi said on Sunday: “Our right of the defense ministry may not be waived, compromised, or negotiated, and we will not recognize any other figure for the ministry at any cost.” The group threatened to consider the UN-imposed government as an illegitimate body if it failed to meet their demands that either Khalifa Haftar or Al-Mihdi Al-Bargathi be chosen as minister of defence.
Deputy Prime Minister of the GNA, Ali Al-Gotrani is again threatening to suspend his membership in the GNA if a defence minister is nominated. He is demanding that the position remain vacant for at least two months as western signatories reject naming a pro-Haftar figure to the job. The Libya Observer claims: His request, if approved, would allow Khalifa Haftar to remain in his current position as commander-in-chief of Tobruk Parliament forces in the light of HoR request to annul article 08 of Skhirat agreement.
This makes no sense to me. Article 8 gives the position of commander in chief of the LNA to the Presidency Council. There are two sections 8 as I have pointed out many times. One gave the Presidency Council the function of commander in chief as of the signing of the LPA on December 17th. This section is ignored by the mass media and everyone that counts. The other section eight, in the main text, gives the function to the Presidency Council immediately upon a vote of confidence in the GNA by the HoR. Al-Gotrani unlike the Dignity Brigades will not accept the former nominee to the defense ministry, Al-Baraghi since he is at odds with Haftar at present even though he is part of Haftar’s Dignity Operation and is acceptable to the Benghazi brigades. I do not see how freezing the appointment of the defense ministry could annul article 8 of the LPA. Even Kobler says, the LPA cannot be amended until it is given a vote of confidence in the HoR as it stands now. Leaving Haftar on the job would simply violate the terms of the LPA once again. This may not matter to the UN but it will cause disruption in the GNA.. One section 8 in the additional provisions has been violated for well over a month since it took away Haftar’s job on December 17. If the HoR votes confidence in the GNA without Haftar losing his job, this will just be a second violation of the LPA. However, if this happens you can expect many GNC members who signed on to the GNA to leave, or if they stay, to block any attempts to appoint a pro-Haftar defense minister.
