Op-Ed: U.S. forces raid Pakistani town, Pakistan government protests

Now it’s official. In the first ground attack on Pakistani soil US Special Ops troops attacked militants in the North Western Frontier. The Pakistan government isn’t at all happy, and says it reserves the right to “self-defense and retaliation.”

This is the natural result of the last several years of failed efforts to shut down Taliban and Al Qaeda supplies and bases on the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan’s own efforts have been costly defeats in some cases and just haven’t worked in any real sense to even hamper the supply routes. The situation has been one of the constant stress fractures in the US/Pakistan relationship, and it hasn’t been getting better, with or without Musharraf. Pakistan was the original supporter of the Taliban against the Soviets, with U.S. assistance. The same basic networks which created and armed the Taliban are considered to be fully functional. There’s also an added level of difficulty in that Iran is now a credible facilitator, if the ongoing impasse over the nuclear issues leads to active retaliation. The Taliban’s “offensive” in Afghanistan is getting a lot of media coverage, but as a purely military situation it’s nothing new. The areas around the capital are very porous, and nobody in their right mind, on either side, would claim they were secure. The major issue continues to be the easy access from Pakistan, and that’s clearly the rationale behind this attack. The New York Times:

Until now, allied forces in Afghanistan have occasionally carried out airstrikes and artillery attacks in the border region of Pakistan against militants hiding there, and American forces in “hot pursuit” of militants have had some latitude to chase them across the border.

But the commando raid by the American forces signaled what top American officials said could be the opening salvo in a much broader campaign by Special Operations forces against the Taliban and Al Qaeda inside Pakistan, a secret plan that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has been advocating for months within President Bush’s war council.

It also seemed likely to complicate relations with Pakistan, where the already unstable political situation worsened after the resignation last month of President Pervez Musharraf, a longtime American ally.

No kidding. The “already unstable” situation, as a matter of fact, is almost irrelevant in that part of Pakistan. The Pakistani government’s actual control over the tribal areas is effectively zero. Musharraf lost a lot of troops trying to exert control. The present government has even less political clout, and the Pakistani army may or may not be terribly enthused about trying to take out the supply routes. Militarily, they’d be right to be unenthused. That’s very tough country, and it’s not just a matter of sending a few troops and looking like they’re achieving something. The whole of Pakistan would know in seconds, and the Islamic militants in Pakistan wouldn’t be slow to create a major internal issue as propaganda and a diversion. The U.S., for its part, doesn’t have a lot of choice in terms of actual combat realities. The Taliban, without the supply routes, wouldn’t have much of a chance to operate at all. With the routes safe, a regular supply of reinforcements and resources has been thriving. That includes the opium trade, the primary cash cow of terrorism and crime in the region. Borders and the use of other countries as safe havens isn’t exactly a new tactic. It is, however, a tactic where both international law and political wills don’t usually want to get involved. The U.S. military is taking a bold, but difficult, step, and the results will need to measure up. Case in point:

There were conflicting reports about civilian casualties in the operation. American officials said one child had been killed in the strike; a Pakistani military spokesman said the American troops had opened fire on villagers, killing seven people.

After the attack, Pakistan lodged a “strong protest” with the American government and reserved the right of “self-defense and retaliation,” said the Pakistani military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas.

Legally, Pakistan is within its rights regarding the presence of foreign troops on its territory. It’s also well outside the law in terms of harboring forces making war on another country. The large numbers of heavily armed and highly irritated American military in Afghanistan may or may not take any “retaliation” seriously. But it will have occurred to at least some of them that wouldn’t be all bad. Pakistan is claiming that alleged civilian deaths in the attack will cause an uprising by tribesmen in the region who have supported government troops. The total number of government supportive tribesmen might even be in double figures, for all anyone knows, or cares. The obvious intent of this charade is that any misadventures on the part of subsequent U.S. raids can now be seen as defending national sovereignty. Pakistani troops can dress up as tribesmen, too, in their tireless defence of whatever they’re defending. Pakistani politics have one unalterable reality: Nobody’s strong enough to handle the other parties. The fractures are very deep, and it’s easy to create some very unholy alliances by antagonizing any of the parties. The new Pakistani government doesn’t have the unity to try using executive power against the interests of any of the major factions. At least some Pakistani officials seem remarkably well informed about this secret attack. Washington hasn’t released any details other than bare bones, and some not very helpful comments about casualties. The Pakistanis, meanwhile, are conducting a running commentary.

A senior Pakistani official called the commando raid a “cowboy action” and said it had failed to capture or kill any senior Qaeda or Taliban leaders.

“If they had gotten anyone big, they would be bragging about it,” he said.

The Pakistani official said that American military officers in the field had become increasingly vocal about the need for unilateral strikes inside the tribal areas, but that their intelligence about the location of militant leaders was no better than it had been in the past.

Now who would have that good quality information, I wonder? Meanwhile, the Taliban propaganda machine has cranked up and sounds very like the Pakistani version, interestingly enough. Pakistan is a pygmy among giants. It has two emerging superpowers to its east, and a large and potentially threatening Iran to its west. It’s also in the process of antagonizing an ally who’s been pretty tolerant of its various hobbies and obvious failures. Let’s hope Pakistan knows what it’s doing, because nobody else does.